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Tribune 
GENUS AND FAMILY : CONCEPTS AND NATURAL GROUPINGS 
Armand R. MAGGENTI 
University of California  Davis,  Department of Nenzatology, Davis, CA 95616, USA. 
A little over two hundred  and  fifty ears ago Linnaeus 
(= Linne)  began  to  maneuver his concepts of animal 
arrangement into Aristotle’s logic of classes. Twenty- 
three years elapsed  between  the  publication of his first 
and  tenth editions of (( Systema  naturae D. The  tenth 
edition (1758) is the acknowledged starting point of 
zoological nomenclature. Often forgotten but highly 
significant is the fact that he spent those intervening 
twenty years orchestrating  the  then  known  animals  into 
the world of philosophy. 
Linnaeus’ genius was conceiving that science and 
philosophy can blend  and  that  theology,  though highly 
influential to his concepts, was not  the al1 controlling 
unit.  He was influenced  by Aristotle’s logic of classes, 
Plato’s “ essence ” and  Thomistic theology. This may be 
best explained by  simplistic  definiti0ns:science  at- 
tempts to delimit what is true; philosophy seeks to 
define  truth; theology, which  Linnaeus was unable  to 
completely escape, intervenes in as much as the de- 
mands of faith supersede delimitation and definition. 
Understand, Linnaeus was polarized by the sixteenth 
century  observation : philosophia  ancilla  theologiae (phi- 
losophy is the  maid-servant of theology). 
T o  a large extent, and  unfortunately so, science has 
come to limit the  genius of Linnaeus  to G creating )) the 
binomial system of nomenclature.  Binomial  nomencla- 
ture was extant hundreds of years before  Linnaeus; his 
proposa1 established the  binomial as unambiguous. The 
names and groups he offered are not important. The 
introduction of an unambiguous binomial nomencla- 
ture  and  the logic  of classes and  its  application  to biology 
are important  because  for  the  first  time  the diversity of 
living organisms was organized  in  a  manner  that rev- 
olutionized human thought. However, Linnaeus’ philo- 
sophy  remained  Aristotelian  and  he was dedicated  to  the 
application of Aristotle’s system of logic to classification 
(Tuxen, 1973). Later generations up to and including 
Darwin  succeeded  in  excising  Linnaean  philosophy 
from  Linnaeus’ proposa1 while retaining the essence of 
a rigid hierarchy of categories and an unambiguous 
binomial  nomenclature. 
Darwin’s contributions  encouraged us to use Our 
abilities to see what everyone else has  seen  and yet think 
beyond  this  neurologic  limitation. It is this that spotligh- 
ted  Darwin. Wallace, hindered  by theology, was unable 
to  take  the  step  beyond  seeing  what others  had  seen to 
the  realm of thinking  what others had  not  thought. As 
a result Darwin’s thesis on the origin of species has 
influenced biology for over one hundred years and 
Wallace is remembered  for  presenting  a  similar  hypoth- 
esis that his theology  would  not allow him  to  expand. 
Linnaeus  provided  the  grist  upon  which  Darwin  and 
others worked. However, Darwin and others were lead- 
ers in initiating the shift from the concept of a uti- 
litarian  classification  based on  the  procedures of logic 
that  primarily  functioned as an  instrument  for identifi- 
cation,  to the much broader interpretation that the 
diversity of organisms  resulted  from  evolutionary diver- 
gence  (Mayr, 1969). Thus, there was a major shift from 
identification to classification and  the process of reason- 
ing  became  inductive  rather  than  deductive.  Recently, 
in  nematology,  there  has  been  an  inclination  to  revert  to 
deductive  reasoning  in  the  formulation of classifications 
(Andrassy, 1976; Fotedar & Handoo,  1978;  Siddiqi, 
1986). In these classifications the categories above the 
species  are  based on  an a  priori arrangement of morpho- 
logic characters rather than on natural groupings as 
interpreted  through  known biology. 
Linnaen classification has not been without oppo- 
sition and criticism. Attacks on  the system  generally arise 
from  an inability to  comprehend  a rigid hierarchy  with 
an  inherent  need  for arbitrary  ranking. The assignment 
of intractable  values  to  ranks  within the  hierarchy  would 
paralyze the  system  into  a  desinence  that  would  preclude 
improvement.  Perception of the intrinsic  subjectivity of 
the system allows for the incompleteness of Our know- 
ledge of relationships and  presents us with  the  oppor- 
tunity to test  alternate  models of relationship, thus 
maximizing  information.  Systematists  hould  accept 
and welcome the  fact  that  the  system will forever  remain 
provisional. 
There are seven basic categories that prevail in the 
modern  interpretations of Linnaeus’  hierarchies. Al1 are 
not those proposed by Linnaeus (classis, ordo, genus, 
species, and varietas) but those that new knowledge 
demanded.  After  more  than  two  hundred years only fïve 
(genus, family, order, class and phylum) permit US t O  
place  a  species  with  any  degree of accuracy.  Even  these 
did not satisfy Our need to more accurately portray 
relationships;  therefore, over the years more  precise 
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designations were imperative and the prefxes super- 
and  sub- were  attached  to  the  basic  categories. 
With  no sense of the  purpose of Linnaean  hierarchy 
some  other  terms have been  introduced  and have, not 
unexpectedly,  become  the  subject of confusion  because 
they do not convey relationship nor do they add to 
perception of nematode biology. The  terms referred to 
are : biotype, race and pathotype. On  the  other  hand 
some terms that have received a notable degree of 
acceptance  are : tribe,  between  family  and  genus,  and 
group  between  genus  and  subgenus. However,  as useful 
as they are, they have not  warranted  recognition by the 
International  Commission of Zoological  Nomenclature 
for inclusion in the rules for “ binomial (trinomial) 
nomenclature ”. It is not  surprising  that  these  perceptive 
additions amplify the ability to express relationships 
within  the two most  informative  categories  in  the  hier- 
archy of classification; i.e., the genus and family. Both 
additions  are  designed  to  expand Our ability to  cope  with 
new knowledge of relationships without the need to 
overinflate the basic categories. This  simply  means  that 
genera  do  not have to  be raised to families  or  families 
to orders. Thus  funher illustrating the genius of the 
Linnaean-Darwin-Mayr  philosphy of classification and 
perhaps, with an affordable degree of magnanimity, 
Aristotle’s legacy to biology: the gft of the logic of 
classes. 
This disquisition  set-out  to  address the logical conse- 
quence of purporting  to  understand  and  accept  that a 
classification and ranking in a hierarchy reflect rela- 
tionships. From  the  foregoing  statements  it  should  now 
be  evident  that  the  backbone of a  Sound  classification is 
entrenched in Our perception of the genus and its 
projected  concept - the family. 
Linnaeus  in 1737 gave lasting advice in his dictum : 
“ Its the genus that gives the characters and not the 
characters  that  make  the  genus. ” Though it  would  be 
highly desirable to have characters or even a single 
character  that  unequivocally  designated  categorical 
rank, we must  accept  the  fact  that  such does not exist 
(Mayr, 1969). Therefore,  it also follows that  taxonomic 
characters  that  prove  generic  distinctions  do  not exist. 
It is also true  that  non-arbitrary definitions  at the 
categorical level  of genus  and  above  are  not  possible  to 
give. 
Systematics  can only florish in  the  realm of flexibility; 
it is a  science of concepts  and  realities  or pragmatically, 
definitions and descriptions.  Absolute  definitions  would 
stifle future knowledge because in the world of the 
absolute, freedom to express new information concern- 
ing relationships could not exist. Many scientists find 
this  situation  difficult to  accept  and  even  more difficult 
to work with. It is among these  scientists that there is an 
expressed dissatisfaction with the  Linnaean hierarchy. 
It has  even  been  suggested  that  category  names  be re- 
placed with numbers (Lervtrup, 1979). Numbers are 
only unit expressions of mathematical concepts and a 
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false faith  or  faith  in  a rigid system  based  on  numbers 
cannot  escape  the reality  thar  taxa are based on zoologi- 
cal realities. Categories, no matter how depicted are 
concepts; however, they  are  concepts based on  natural 
occumng  units. 
The most objective of al1 categories remains  the 
species, for a further  discussion of the objectivity and 
definition of the species  see  Maggenti (1983). The 
species category differs from al1 other divisions in  the 
hierarchy  in  that  it signifies  singularity,  distinctness and 
difference (Mayr, 1969). Categories above the species 
are collective concepts  inasmuch as they have the 
function of grouping  and  ordering by  de-emphasizing 
differences  between  species and  emphasizing  affinities 
among  groups of species. Mayr (1969) States : “ Even 
though  an  operational definition for  the  higher catego- 
ries does  not exist, nor  for  the rank which they signify, 
they  do  have  an objective basis because  a taxon placed 
in  a  higher  category (if correctly  delimited) is natural, 
consisting of descendants  from  a  common ancestor. ” 
Since  there  is  no  operational  definition of the  genus 1 
will adopt Mayr’s  pragmatic  definition: “ A genus is a 
taxonomic category containing a single species, or a 
monophyletic  group of species, which is separated  from 
other  taxa of the same  rank (other  genera) by a  decided 
gap. ” In general, the size of the  gap is inversely 
proportional  to  the size of the  taxon.  This is a  schooled 
observation  and  not a  rule. 
In view  of the  fact  that  there is no operational  defi- 
nition of the  genus  and  inasmuch as there is no dis- 
tinctive single or  group of characters  that a priori make 
a  genus,  then its  circumscription  must be sought else- 
where. Since  strict  morphology  cannot  delineate  the ge- 
nus then the alternative to understanding the affiities 
among species must lie in  their biology and ancestry. 
The latter, obviously, refers to their phylogenetic deve- 
lopment  from a common ancestor, and in this context 
a genus will have  common  features  that facilitate reco- 
gnition.  Therefore,  one of the  features of a  genus is that 
it  embrace  in  the  hierarchy  a collective assemblage of 
species that  comprise  a  phylogenetic  unit.  Even  though 
the genus is a phylogenetic unit there need not be a 
single species which is immediately  ancestral  to al1 
species in the genus. A genus can be derived from 
several species in  a  genus  in  which  the ancestral  species 
were grouped. It is not  required  that a new genus  be 
proposed  for  each ancestral species. 
As a  phylogenetic  unit  the  genus  differs  from  similar 
and related  assemblages  by  reflecting  an ecological unit 
that is adapted  to  a particular mode of Iife; Le., a valid 
genus  occupies  a  niche.  Because  the  genus occupies an 
ecological niche it makes an evolutionary  statement  that 
the  individual species, making up  the assemblage, can- 
not  make  independently. 
Among parasitic groups, in Our case nematodes, it 
should  be  easier to recognize  genera (where the biology , 
is generally well known)  than  it is among  the so-called 
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Genus and family 
freeliving  genera  (where-the biology is seldom  known). 
However, this does  not seem to  be  the  case  among  the 
plant parasitic  nematodes  nor the  animal parasitic  nema- 
todes.  Over the last twenty to  thirty years the  number 
of nominal genera in Tylenchina has increased at a 
logarithmic rate. The recent revision of Tylenchina 
(Maggenti et al., 1988) has  accepted  a 46 O/o reduction 
in  the  number of genera  in  Tylenchoidea  and  a  58 O/o 
reduction in the number of genera accepted in the 
Criconematoidea. The philosophy  employed  by  this 
team of researchers, Luc, Maggenti, Fortuner, Raski 
and  Geraert (1987),  was that  outlined above: seek 
phylogenetic  units, ecological units  and a  generic  niche; 
these  precepts were  extended  to  their logical conclusion 
- the family. 
The family  being  an  abstract  concept of a  naturally 
occurring  assemblage of taxa (genera)  cannot  be  given 
a nonarbitrary definition and therefore, the only assi- 
gned definition is nearly  equivalent to  that given for  the 
genus by Mayr (1969): " A family is a taxonomic 
category containing a single genus or a monophyletic 
group of genera,  which is separated  from  other families 
by a decided gap. " Once again it has been generally 
observed  that  the  gap is inversely proportional  to  the  size 
of the family. 
If the genus should occupy an ecological niche it 
follows that its logical projection, the famfly, of necessity 
must also  occupy  a well-defined %Che or  adaotive  zone. 
The family owes its  origin  to the  invasion of  '$sis zone 
by one'or  more  founder species and  to  the  subsequent 
active and  adaptive radiation  which follows a  successful 
adaptive  shift.  Because of this the family is the  category 
that  should  provide  the  most  information  among al1 the 
assigned ranks in the entire hierarchy. The available 
information  on  any  assemblage of taxa decreases above 
and below the  family level; therefore, it is a  rank  to  be 
assigned  with  a  great  deal of caution  and consideration. 
Obviously,  since  there is no  operative definition nor 
single or group of morphological characters that deli- 
neate a family, then family designation in any given 
phylum will be individualistic but the  philosophy  ap- 
plied should  be  the  same.  In  the class Insecta there  are 
some  one  million species distributed  among  some 
940 families or roughly one family for 1 060 species 
(obviously  there  are  some  smaller  and  some  larger). In 
Nemata there are  some 200 families for  some 
15 O00 nominal species. Within  Nemata  this  implies  that 
a  great  deal of extinction has occurred and  that  what 
remains  are  clear-cut  axonomic isles. Any cursory 
attempt  to work with  the families of nematodes  quickly 
convinces  one  that  the differences  between  families  are 
often so slight as to  defy  recognition  or  identification, 
when  the  opposite  should  be  more  often true. Careful 
consideration  should  be given to  whether  some of Our 
superfamilies  and  perhaps even some  suborders  are  not 
in reality  families; it is often  at  this level in  the classifi- 
cation of Nemata  that well-defined niches  or  adaptive 
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gains  as well as evidence of extinction  are  most  evident. 
There are some broad features or generalizations 
that, though not generally applied in systematics to 
distinguish the family, are. applicable to the family 
concept.  Unequivocally,  families  are  older  than  genera 
and  often world-wide in distribution. In general, and thk 
should  be given serious  consideration  among  nemato- 
logists, the family should have a general facies easily 
recognizable. The latter is easily verified  by Our ability 
to  recognize  some  families  under  the  dissection  micro- 
scope;  this  should  not  be  interpreted as a  mechanism to 
recognize families. 
It should  not  be  surprising  that  as  knowledge of taxa 
increases world-wide that  family  designations  often 
require rethinking.  World-wide  families  have  a  tendency 
to internally  break into distinctive groups  and  it is to  be 
expected that intermediate groups will be found and 
quite  often relic groups  discovered  that Cloud the issues. 
One only has to consider  ecent  finds  among  the 
Heteroderidae  to  confirm  this  generalization.  When this 
occurs we have two choices: the  known families can  be 
raised to superfamilies (the simplest solution, though 
more often than not the least satisfactory) or we can 
rethink  the available information  and  expand Our 
concepts by combining and reducing the number of 
families. 
The heart of a  classification  is founded  on  the stability 
of its  recognized  families.  Family  stability is essential to 
a useful classification that affords maximum commu- 
nication and  in  turn offers the greatest amount of infor- 
mation with maximum retrieval. Splitting, at any level 
within  the  hierarchy,  makes  information retrieval more 
difficdt  and in some instances impossible. The uncurb- 
ed addition of taxa  without  regard  for their  effects on 
other categories or their illogical placement  within  the 
system, can only result in  the  continued  repression of 
nematological knowledge. It is imperative that we re- 
examine nematode classification and the philosophies 
that are  being  applied  to  determine  the  categorical  ranks 
within  the hierarchy. 
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